Extinction Bounties

Policy-based deterrence for the 21st century.

Policy-Research Disclaimer (click to close)

Extinction Bounties publishes theoretical economic and legal mechanisms intended to stimulate scholarly and public debate on catastrophic-risk governance. The site offers policy analysis and advocacy only in the sense of outlining possible legislative or contractual frameworks.

  • No Legal or Financial Advice. Nothing here should be treated as a substitute for qualified legal counsel, financial due-diligence, or regulatory guidance. Stakeholders remain responsible for ensuring their actions comply with the laws and professional standards of their own jurisdictions.
  • Exploratory & Personal Views. All scenarios, numerical examples and opinions are research hypotheses presented by the author in an academic capacity. They do not represent the views of the author’s employer, funding bodies, or any governmental authority.
  • Implementation Caveats. Any real-world adoption of these ideas would require democratic deliberation, statutory authority, and robust safeguards to prevent misuse. References to enforcement, penalties, or “bounties” are illustrative models, not instructions or invitations to engage in private policing or unlawful conduct.
  • No Warranty & Limited Liability. Content is provided “as is” without warranty of completeness or accuracy; the author disclaims liability for losses arising from reliance on this material.

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Our 2-minute elevator pitch

But Who Would Insure a Criminal?

But Who Would Insure a Criminal?

The idea of paying whistleblowers hefty rewards from fines collected from the very wrongdoers they expose sounds great in theory.
But there’s an obvious problem: not every wrongdoer is rich enough to afford the fine—whether that’s a $1,000 fine for littering or the kind of multi-million-dollar fines we at Extinction Bounties are really interested in.

Our answer: private insurers would quickly emerge to cover the vast majority of the population for whatever activities we decide to impose FIBs on.

If you’re not familiar with how insurance works behind the scenes, however, this leads to a very understandable question:

Who in their right mind would insure people against fines for breaking the law? Isn’t that like insuring someone against the consequences of their own crimes?

At first glance, it seems bizarre.
But surprisingly, there’s a compelling economic logic behind this puzzle.

Why Insurers Enter the Picture

In a FIB system, fines are designed to be very large—potentially huge.
Without insurance, committing even a single violation (say, illegal dumping, tax fraud, or unsafe AI research) could not only bankrupt an individual or company, it could even land them in jail.

Insurers spot an opportunity here:
They can offer protection against catastrophic financial loss in exchange for premiums.

But here’s the catch: insurers aren’t naïve.
They have zero incentive to protect reckless criminals. Instead, they behave like highly sophisticated risk managers:

Insurers become the ultimate private regulators.
To minimize their own risk, insurers actively:

If an insurer pulls away, bounty hunters immediately know to pay attention.

A Self-Policing Ecosystem

This system naturally creates:

Importantly:
Insurers do not protect criminals from punishment.
They protect honest clients from ruinous accusations or rare accidents, while punishing dishonesty through impossible insurance costs.

Why It Works

The result is a self-policing market equilibrium, where:

Private profit motives, not centralized surveillance, drive compliance.

Next, we’ll explore how this insurance dynamic can help enforce safe AI development practices.
Stay tuned!